Tuesday, 11 August 2015
The Birth of the Eurasian Dragon
By Victoria Kelly-Clark
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, America’s global leadership has been under fire. Many countries, including China and Russia, have expressed their belief that the prolonged global dominance of the United States through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank is not acceptable.
This has made the Unites States understandably nervous. For in the current foreign policy climate, America is far too entrenched in the Middle East to effectively deal with threats to its financial dominance. This has given China and Russia the opportunity they need to lay the groundwork for a new economic order where they can operate on equal terms with America.
Bretton Woods the Chinese Way?
This has previously been impossible thanks to the 1943 Bretton Woods agreement. Essentially this deal allowed the US dollar to be used as the global reserve currency from the end of World War II onwards. For the United States this has ensured longevity to its role as the global superpower because the world cannot do without its currency as long as nations wish to trade internationally. Challenging the American led system is a very difficult challenge; however, China appears to have found a way.
The Chinese, already frustrated with the failure of the international order to accommodate its rising wealth and economic needs, have reached out to its ‘frenemy’ Russia. Russia, hit with disciplinary economic sanctions after the 2014 involvement in the Ukrainian crisis and after the huge drop in the price of oil, has seen its economy faltering dramatically. Rapid loss of profits from its hydrocarbon trading programs, thanks to an increase in American oil supply, and the dramatic plunge of the rouble have caused the Russian economy to implode.
China, observing this in 2014, saw an opportunity to create a new international monetary system based around the Yuan via an economic bloc formed with the Russians..China decided to provide its ‘big brother’ with as much aid as Russia needs. China and Russia started to bypass the dollar in all hydrocarbon exchanges, developing their own system that traded in their own currencies. In doing this China took a step toward creating a new system for international exchanges. As argued by Russian President Putin at APEC, ‘Switching to settlements in domestic currencies can largely contribute to balancing the global economy by reducing the impact of the dollar on the world financial and energy markets.’
The success of this Eurasian hydrocarbon trading scheme has meant trade between the two countries has increased dramatically according to Lin Zhi, head of the Europe and Central Asia Department of the Chinese Ministry of Economic Development. According to RT.com, Mr. Lin argued that the use of the Yuan in trading settlements increased ninefold in 2014 from 2013 when it was at 2%.
The Rise of the Eurasian Dragon
Building on this successful economic integration, Russia and China have forged ahead developing their vision for a Eurasian Economic Union which will be linked by a single currency like the Euro. Furthering this union is the Chinese establishment of the Silk Road Belt Economic Initiative which will establish infrastructure to link China with Europe across Central Asia. Argued to be Central Asia’s version of the Marshall Plan, it appears that China is trying to create a Eurasian Dragon state that can rival Europe and America.
Backed by China’s New Development Bank with its BRICS partners Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa and its 100 billion dollar alternative to the World Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB, China has set a course for changing the international monetary community. With this financial clout, China and its closest partners, like those in an Eurasian Union, will become financially powerful entities on the back of the Yuan, thus turning Eurasia into a new global hegemon.
Global Expansion
China is in an ideal position for this challenge as it is flush with the world’s largest reserve of foreign currencies and it must find a way to utilise it. However, China is clearly doing more than just angling for a bigger share of the global financial pie.
Take, for example, China’s recent expansionist moves in the South Pacific. Utilising every means possible China is expanding its maritime claims in the oil rich South China Sea. According to the Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry Harris, China is even going to the extent of dredging sand over reefs and then concreting over the newly formed land so it can build military structures on them to protect its interests in the region. At present it is estimated that they have create 4 kilometres of extra Chinese coastline. Arguing that China is “creating a great wall of sand with dredges and bulldozers” Admiral Harris highlighted how concerned the United States is over this recent behaviour.
America’s Predicament: To Ignore or To Engage?
The United States now faces the question of how to deal with this rapidly developing Chinese led power. Certainly the United States must maintain its presence in the Middle East as it continues to referee the latest Sunni-Shiite rivalry and hinder the rise of the Islamic State. However, it cannot afford to ignore the nascent Eurasian Dragon that is on its door step. As Gordon Chang recently argued in Global Affairs, “if this challenge is not checked the world will again be divided into spheres of influence and this will create the optimum environment for conflicts”.
Maintaining economic pressure on Russia will certainly go a long way to contain China’s development of a Eurasian Union. China, although currently cashed up, will not wish to hitch their wagon to a failing Russian economy that it needs to prop up. Likewise, engaging with China in the AIIB will enable the US to provide a guiding hand in its development.
Thursday, 23 July 2015
Putin's Power Play
This is an extended version of my recent article in The Epoch Times
Putin’s Power Play
In the past months since the unrest in the Ukraine led to Russia’s unofficial occupation of eastern areas and the Crimean region, the international community has appeared shocked and appalled. Many have argued the world is entering a new era. Phrases like ‘a new Cold War’ have been suggested and many countries have been struggling to respond coherently, seemingly stunned by Vladmir Putin’s audacity to openly take advantage of neighbouring political instability. The lack of real world consequences for Russia has meant that Putin has no plans to withdraw any time soon. If anything it appears he only plans to consolidate his initial acquisition.
But is Russia merely being a peacekeeper or mirotvorchestvo in the region[1]. Or is it the latest move by Russian authorities, in a territorial game of Hungry Hippo with the European Union? The goal of course being that you grab as much territory bordering Europe as possible in the hope you will stop the EU and NATO encroaching on your economic and political interests. Alternatively is this a hard-line Putin keeping his precious Russia safe and protecting Russians lost during the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Or is this the start of the creation of a Eurasian superpower to rival China and the United States?
Russia the Eurasian Bear
Bridging both East and West, Russia has never viewed itself as a ‘western power’. Hemmed in by European powers to the west, Russia has often engaged in an eastern facing foreign policy. Clearly identifying its eastern territory’s and its soft underbelly of strategic importance. Thus by the time of the 20th century and the Soviet Union, the empire of mother Russia stretched from the Pacific to the Baltic and had control over territories bordering Iran and Pakistan.
But in creating such an empire and then the soviet experiment it became apparent that ethnic Russians were often regarded as the ‘body of loyal servants’[2], who could assist in governing the vast land. So despite its 1920-1930’s nativisation policy and the attempt to create a soviet man, the Russian Soviet authorities still took the advice of Machiavelli, elevating their own trusted agents, mobilising their own people to monitor other populations and integrating Russian communities into other regions in an attempt to enhance the unification of the state and society.
As a result, historically Russian regions like the Crimea [3] and Donetsk were attached to another country and territory. While this was not a problem under the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Union meant that many of these former Russian territories and populations were suddenly an ethnic minority and small enclaves and Russian regions formed creating a network of communities that longed to return to the ‘motherland’.
In Kazakhstan, for example, in the early years of independence many predominantly ethnic Russian territories wanted to return to Russia’s fold. In 2000 ethnic Russian leaders from northern regions met with the newly elected president Vladmir Putin to discuss the pressures they faced and strategies for their return to Russia. This meeting resulted in a proposal of a mass immigration of the remainder of Russians from Kazakhstan and the plan was to use these returning Russians as a revitalizing force for the depopulated areas of central Russia[4].
RUSSOPHOBIA
But do ethnic Russians in the states bordering Russia facing the daily grind of ethnic abuse? The presence of ethnic Russians within the former soviet states has been a cause of tension within many of the former soviet republics. In Latvia for example, many ethnic Russians consider themselves to be second class citizens as they were not granted immediate citizenship upon the creation of the new state. Currently it is reported that 270, 000 Latvians do not carry citizenship and many are living in areas that border Russia[5]. Being unable to vote or gain entry to the public services and various other benefits has left many disgruntled. Calling themselves second class citizens, many Russian speaking Latvians have endured being called occupiers and argue that racial abuse is a real problem in the former soviet states.
In 2006 for example, many Russians in Central Asia argued that they faced racial discrimination in Kazakhstan due to the implementation of the national language policy as a requirement for employment in government. Effectively this excluded many ethnic Russians from holding positions of power and the nationalism established from this policy made these Russians easy targets for Kazakhs who felt justified in shaming the Russians for their years in privilege.
I myself experienced this when on my fourth day in Kazakhstan I was entering the national library in Almaty and was told it was closed. Not immediately being familiar with Kazakh I replied in Russian only to be told in Russian that I should not speak Russian as I was in Kazakhstan and that the gentlemen was speaking Kazakh and I was extremely rude for not knowing the language of the country. While I was not beaten or attacked, the vehemence with which I was told off was quite surprising. Likewise many young Russian men I met were regularly attacked when they went out with friends due to their inability to integrate themselves into the status quo. Kazakhstan is not the only post-soviet state where such acts of aggression have occurred.
In the Ukraine, according to a report by Luke Harding in the Guardian on the 21st of March 2014 there have been several serious attacks on pro-Russian supporters in the different regions. Harding reports that in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkhiv pro-Russian supporters clashed with the Patriots of Ukraine leaving two confirmed dead. While in the Russian speaking cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk the Russian media has reported a swathe of attacks by, neo- nationalist supporters[6].
Unquestionably public sentiment towards ethnic Russians in the Western parts of the Ukraine has also been decreasing. According to a poll taken in 2010 by the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Science of Ukraine, positive attitudes towards Russians have continued to decrease since 1994. In response to a question gauging tolerance of Russians, only 15% of Western Ukrainians responded positively. In Central Ukraine, only 30% responded positively (from 60% in 1994); 60% responded positively in Southern Ukraine (from 70% in 1994); and 64% responded positively in Eastern Ukraine (from 75% in 1994). Furthermore, 6-7% of Western Ukrainians would banish Russians entirely from Ukraine, and 7-8% in Central Ukraine responded similarly. This level of sentiment was not found in Southern or Eastern Ukraine.[45]
While these attacks in the Ukraine have formulated the backbone of Putin’s main argument for his reclaiming of the Crimea, all is not as it seems. Many Ukrainians have heaped derision upon the Russian assertions. According to many Ukrainians all the pro-Russian protests and attacks have been orchestrated by the Kremlin. In Kharkiv, 20-40 buses of Russian activists were brought in to protest from the nearby Russian city of Belgorod. The new Ukrainian government has stated that these protestors were paid provocateurs. An argument supported by a Kharkhiv journalist and pro-Russian Andrei Borodavka who admitted ‘around 200’ Russian citizens had been bussed in to support these rallies[7].If the Russians are actually agitating in the eastern and southern areas of the Ukraine, is this part of a new direction in foreign policy?
Just another Case of Protecting Russia from its near Abroad
So while there is some merit to Putin’s assertion that he was keeping ethnic Russians safe, there is also a shadow of doubt that this is all part of a more orchestrated strategy for territorial dominance. According to Jonson and Archer, since 1993 Russia has had an aggressive foreign policy mandate. In 1993, for example, the then Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, argued that the entire former Soviet Union was understood to be Russia’s sphere of influence and that it was therefore Russia’s responsibility to maintain peace and security within its former empire. Any other incursion by a foreign player into this sphere was unacceptable. Primarily it argued that this was because a third party intruding in this sphere could create the conditions for a large scale conflict[8]. As a result Russian foreign policy engages in conflicts outside its homeland in an effort to protect said homeland from outside forces influencing its satellite states.
This reasoning was the motive behind stationing Russian forces outside of their home territory. Likewise it was the motivation for Russian involvement in Abkhazia and Ngorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) conflicts. In Azerbaijan for example, the Russians became concerned by the election of the Leader of the anti-Russian pro-Turkish Azerbaijan Popular Front Elchibei. Seeing the possibility that Turkey and Iran could enter into its zone of interest Russia tried successfully to manipulate the domestic political environment in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. This direct involvement in Azerbaijan resulted in the 1993 coup that removed then President Elchibei and brought Aliev to power.
With Aliev in power Russia brought Armenia and Azerbaijan to the mediation table and Azerbaijan joined the new Russian led economic union the Commonwealth of Independent States or the CIS. It is speculated that, as a result of this interference, Russia also managed to renew an agreement to station it troops in the territory and receive a share of Azerbaijan’s offshore oil profits[9].
Further proof that Russia likes to keep everyone out of its backyard came from the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia. Abkhazia has traditionally held close ties to Moscow to offset the power of its Georgian rulers. But in 1993 Russia utilised the conflict between the two states to move forward its defensive line. Supplying Abkhazia with military personnel and weaponry Russia undertook a series of destabilizing actions (including not stopping the military incursions by the Abkhazians on the 17 of September 1993) which forced the Georgians to accept a peace deal that brought them into the CIS and gave Russia special base rights and other military privileges[10].
Interestingly it appears that the Russians have utilised this tactic time and time again to secure sections of their outer rim which they fear are being coerced by foreign powers. Using a variety of military and domestic agitation Russia in each of these scenarios and various others, like Transdniestr in Moldova, have managed to create a conflict through which they could then ‘enforce and secure a peace’ and leave them firmly in Russia’s zone of influence.
Putting the Ukraine in their Place
In terms of the Ukraine it could be argued that Russia has entered into different territory. Far more aggressive tactics have certainly been applied, for the annexation of an entire region is not their usual modus operandi. But then again in each of the above conflicts there has never been a large Russian speaking minority. Nor was there a historical belief that the territory was and is ultimately a part of the Russian Federation as was the case with Sevastopol the Crimean capital[11].
Thus, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula is simply another step in the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ mission. Certainly this does fit in with both Russian 21st century foreign policy but it also provides a resolution to the Russo-Ukrainian decade’s long dispute over the former soviet military assets.
Unlike various other states that agreed to participate in the joint CIS military the Russians wanted to create, the Ukrainians had always had the resources, economic power, and strategic location to challenge Russia’s sphere of influence. Certainly the Ukrainian governments claim to the majority of the Black Sea naval fleet has always been a barb in the craw of the Russian Navy which has always highlighted the protection of the country’s southwest flank[12].
Thus deposing the corrupt pro-Russian president Yanukovich, while a necessity, was certainly waving a red flag to the Russian bull. Strategically, economically and politically Russia has simply acted in accordance with its nationalistic foreign policy and protected what it considered to be its own by historical right. Thereby putting the Ukraine, but particularly the European Union, on notice that it will not tolerate further European encroachment into its territory.
Western Impotence Vs Russian Impudence = Civil War
So as the Ukraine heads deeper into the territory of civil war, it appears for all to see how impotent the western powers are to help the Ukrainians. Certainly it would appear that while the western nations supported the protestors on the Maidan, the whole conflict could have been avoided had Brussels and Washington not been so intent upon forcing the Ukraine to choose between the East and the West. Knowing as they did how Russian foreign policy plays out it seems negligent that both the European Union and America were not prepared for this latest development. Regardless of the events leading up to this can the west help the Ukraine in what appears to be a conflict that the Russians are fully prepared to manipulate as they did in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.
Unfortunately the Western powers have a poor track record aiding countries within Russia’s sphere of influence. The lack of aid given to Georgia, Armenian and Azerbaijan and Moldova is illustrated clearly by their capitulation to Russian demands in the end. It has also illustrated clearly to Putin that he may do as he sees fit in his sphere of influence.
Thus, unless NATO is prepared to provide military and economic aid to the Ukraine to counter the Russians domestic manipulations, and demonstrate that they are willing to engage Russia on behalf of the Ukrainians, the Ukraine may enter into a protracted period of civil strife and even war against agitators that are not domestic but are channelled from across the border. This period of instability is sure to create much difficulty for the eastern territory’s and drive them further into the arms of mother Russia forcing the Ukrainian government to cede the eastern half of the state.
In doing so the Ukraine secures peace for its western half but Russia will gain more control over Europe’s gas and oil rents and enable Putin to create his dream of a New Eurasian Empire.
Putin’s New Economic Empire
Putin’s new goal for his next term in office is for the creation of a new Eurasian Economic Empire. Wanting to rival the European Union and Asia, Putin has outlined a plan to establish a Russian led Eurasian Union by 2015. This year was set as the deadline Nicklas Gvosdev argues because until 2015 the United States and NATO are tied up strategically in Afghanistan. But after this period they will again be free to focus on the European situation. He stated that
‘With the eastward expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions sputtering to a close, and with China still primarily focused on South and East Asia, Moscow feels it has the window to begin consolidating a new Eurasia. Rather than have the territory of the former Soviet Union effectively "partitioned" into European and Asian "spheres of influence," Russia instead can re-emerge as a leading global power by creating a new bloc of states that will balance the European Union in the West and a Chinese-led Asia in the East.’[13]
Putin’s goal appears to be to establish a mighty Russian run Eurasian economic empire which creates another economic bloc to rival Asia and the West. To do so he needs to convince his surrounding neighbours he has the bravado to defend this new economic union as he is currently demonstrating with the Ukraine.
Certainly it would appear that Putin’s government is becoming increasingly active in the protection of their petroleum interests in Europe. According to the former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen the environmental movements in countries like Britain have been infiltrated by Russian sources. Mr Rasmussen declared at a briefing for the Chatham House Foreign Affairs think tank that,
“I have met allies who can report that Russia, as part of their sophisticated information and disinformation operations, engaged actively with so-called non-governmental organisations - environmental organisations working against shale gas - to maintain European dependence on imported Russian gas.[14]
While derision has been heaped upon this suggestion from British environmental groups, it does demonstrate the wariness that many in NATO feel towards the Russian government. Such wariness is also a major obstacle to the completion of Putin’s grand. For as the European Union views Russia with increasing derision its desire to infiltrate the territories around Russia will increase exponentially. Creating the potential for a new geopolitical race that may engulf the Eurasian continent.
The Possibility of a Bridge too Far
The most likely scenario though is that the extension of Europe into Russia’s will create a situation that breaks the proverbial Russian foreign policy camel’s back. For if Russia follows its usual tactics of arming, or even supplying ‘rebels’, the Ukraine will push back and given its military capability it may even succeed in driving these militant forces into making a mistake that will destroy the movements support within the Ukraine . But the cost to Russia’s standing may be huge.
Previously Russia has only played these black op destabilisation games with smaller less significant nations. If mistakes occurred it was not played out in an open international context. But within the Ukraine this is no so. Western Ukrainians are highly motivated to draw the Ukraine and other Russian satellite states into the E.U’s. sphere, and this is reciprocated by the European Union which wants to capitalise on gas and oil accessibility of many of these states.
If Russia is proven to have had a hand in any major international incidents within the Ukraine this could incite many European nations to seek direct intervention in the Ukrainian conflict. Peacekeeping missions or even the arming of western Ukraine could become a reality. When faced with the combined fire power of Europe, NATO and the United Nations Putin would be forced to shelve his plans of a creating a Russian led political and economic empire.
[1] Jonson,L & Archer C, 1996, ‘Russia and Peacekeeping in Eurasia’, in, Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, eds. L.Jonson and C. Archer, p.3-32 Westview Press.
[2] Machiavelli, 2012 , p.43
[3] Crimea was made part of the Ukrainian territories in 1954s by Nikita Khruschev a former head of the territory.
[4] Peyrouse, "Nationhood and the Minority Question in Central Asia," 495-96
[5] Krutaine, A & Mardiste, D, 2014, ‘Disquiet in Baltic’s over Sympathies of Russian Speakers’, Reuters.
[6] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/ukraine-nationalist-attacks-russia-supporters-kremlin-deaths
[7] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/ukraine-nationalist-attacks-russia-supporters-kremlin-deaths
[8][8] Jonson and Archer, 1996, 10-11.
[9] Jonson and Archer, 1996, 14-15
[10] Jonson and Archer 1996, 16-17.
[11] This belief was enshrined in 1993 by a resolution of the ex-Supreme Soviet that Sevastopol was and is a fundamental part of the territories of the Russian Federation. (Tuminez, A, 1996, Nationalism and the Interest in Russian Foreign Policy, in The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War,eds. C.A Wallander, Westview Press, pp.41-68.
[12] Russell, W, 1995, Russian Relations with the Near Abroad, in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, ed. P. Shearman, Westview Press, pp. 53-70.
[13] Gvosdev, 16/4/2012, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-new-ussr-6783
[14] A. Rasmussen , 19/6/2014 , ‘Nato boss claims Russia has secretly infiltrated green groups fighting fracking’, in the The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nato-boss-claims-russia-has-secretly-infiltrated-green-groups-fighting-fracking-9549975.html
Putin’s Power Play
In the past months since the unrest in the Ukraine led to Russia’s unofficial occupation of eastern areas and the Crimean region, the international community has appeared shocked and appalled. Many have argued the world is entering a new era. Phrases like ‘a new Cold War’ have been suggested and many countries have been struggling to respond coherently, seemingly stunned by Vladmir Putin’s audacity to openly take advantage of neighbouring political instability. The lack of real world consequences for Russia has meant that Putin has no plans to withdraw any time soon. If anything it appears he only plans to consolidate his initial acquisition.
But is Russia merely being a peacekeeper or mirotvorchestvo in the region[1]. Or is it the latest move by Russian authorities, in a territorial game of Hungry Hippo with the European Union? The goal of course being that you grab as much territory bordering Europe as possible in the hope you will stop the EU and NATO encroaching on your economic and political interests. Alternatively is this a hard-line Putin keeping his precious Russia safe and protecting Russians lost during the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Or is this the start of the creation of a Eurasian superpower to rival China and the United States?
Russia the Eurasian Bear
Bridging both East and West, Russia has never viewed itself as a ‘western power’. Hemmed in by European powers to the west, Russia has often engaged in an eastern facing foreign policy. Clearly identifying its eastern territory’s and its soft underbelly of strategic importance. Thus by the time of the 20th century and the Soviet Union, the empire of mother Russia stretched from the Pacific to the Baltic and had control over territories bordering Iran and Pakistan.
But in creating such an empire and then the soviet experiment it became apparent that ethnic Russians were often regarded as the ‘body of loyal servants’[2], who could assist in governing the vast land. So despite its 1920-1930’s nativisation policy and the attempt to create a soviet man, the Russian Soviet authorities still took the advice of Machiavelli, elevating their own trusted agents, mobilising their own people to monitor other populations and integrating Russian communities into other regions in an attempt to enhance the unification of the state and society.
As a result, historically Russian regions like the Crimea [3] and Donetsk were attached to another country and territory. While this was not a problem under the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Union meant that many of these former Russian territories and populations were suddenly an ethnic minority and small enclaves and Russian regions formed creating a network of communities that longed to return to the ‘motherland’.
In Kazakhstan, for example, in the early years of independence many predominantly ethnic Russian territories wanted to return to Russia’s fold. In 2000 ethnic Russian leaders from northern regions met with the newly elected president Vladmir Putin to discuss the pressures they faced and strategies for their return to Russia. This meeting resulted in a proposal of a mass immigration of the remainder of Russians from Kazakhstan and the plan was to use these returning Russians as a revitalizing force for the depopulated areas of central Russia[4].
RUSSOPHOBIA
But do ethnic Russians in the states bordering Russia facing the daily grind of ethnic abuse? The presence of ethnic Russians within the former soviet states has been a cause of tension within many of the former soviet republics. In Latvia for example, many ethnic Russians consider themselves to be second class citizens as they were not granted immediate citizenship upon the creation of the new state. Currently it is reported that 270, 000 Latvians do not carry citizenship and many are living in areas that border Russia[5]. Being unable to vote or gain entry to the public services and various other benefits has left many disgruntled. Calling themselves second class citizens, many Russian speaking Latvians have endured being called occupiers and argue that racial abuse is a real problem in the former soviet states.
In 2006 for example, many Russians in Central Asia argued that they faced racial discrimination in Kazakhstan due to the implementation of the national language policy as a requirement for employment in government. Effectively this excluded many ethnic Russians from holding positions of power and the nationalism established from this policy made these Russians easy targets for Kazakhs who felt justified in shaming the Russians for their years in privilege.
I myself experienced this when on my fourth day in Kazakhstan I was entering the national library in Almaty and was told it was closed. Not immediately being familiar with Kazakh I replied in Russian only to be told in Russian that I should not speak Russian as I was in Kazakhstan and that the gentlemen was speaking Kazakh and I was extremely rude for not knowing the language of the country. While I was not beaten or attacked, the vehemence with which I was told off was quite surprising. Likewise many young Russian men I met were regularly attacked when they went out with friends due to their inability to integrate themselves into the status quo. Kazakhstan is not the only post-soviet state where such acts of aggression have occurred.
In the Ukraine, according to a report by Luke Harding in the Guardian on the 21st of March 2014 there have been several serious attacks on pro-Russian supporters in the different regions. Harding reports that in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkhiv pro-Russian supporters clashed with the Patriots of Ukraine leaving two confirmed dead. While in the Russian speaking cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk the Russian media has reported a swathe of attacks by, neo- nationalist supporters[6].
Unquestionably public sentiment towards ethnic Russians in the Western parts of the Ukraine has also been decreasing. According to a poll taken in 2010 by the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Science of Ukraine, positive attitudes towards Russians have continued to decrease since 1994. In response to a question gauging tolerance of Russians, only 15% of Western Ukrainians responded positively. In Central Ukraine, only 30% responded positively (from 60% in 1994); 60% responded positively in Southern Ukraine (from 70% in 1994); and 64% responded positively in Eastern Ukraine (from 75% in 1994). Furthermore, 6-7% of Western Ukrainians would banish Russians entirely from Ukraine, and 7-8% in Central Ukraine responded similarly. This level of sentiment was not found in Southern or Eastern Ukraine.[45]
While these attacks in the Ukraine have formulated the backbone of Putin’s main argument for his reclaiming of the Crimea, all is not as it seems. Many Ukrainians have heaped derision upon the Russian assertions. According to many Ukrainians all the pro-Russian protests and attacks have been orchestrated by the Kremlin. In Kharkiv, 20-40 buses of Russian activists were brought in to protest from the nearby Russian city of Belgorod. The new Ukrainian government has stated that these protestors were paid provocateurs. An argument supported by a Kharkhiv journalist and pro-Russian Andrei Borodavka who admitted ‘around 200’ Russian citizens had been bussed in to support these rallies[7].If the Russians are actually agitating in the eastern and southern areas of the Ukraine, is this part of a new direction in foreign policy?
Just another Case of Protecting Russia from its near Abroad
So while there is some merit to Putin’s assertion that he was keeping ethnic Russians safe, there is also a shadow of doubt that this is all part of a more orchestrated strategy for territorial dominance. According to Jonson and Archer, since 1993 Russia has had an aggressive foreign policy mandate. In 1993, for example, the then Foreign Minister, Kozyrev, argued that the entire former Soviet Union was understood to be Russia’s sphere of influence and that it was therefore Russia’s responsibility to maintain peace and security within its former empire. Any other incursion by a foreign player into this sphere was unacceptable. Primarily it argued that this was because a third party intruding in this sphere could create the conditions for a large scale conflict[8]. As a result Russian foreign policy engages in conflicts outside its homeland in an effort to protect said homeland from outside forces influencing its satellite states.
This reasoning was the motive behind stationing Russian forces outside of their home territory. Likewise it was the motivation for Russian involvement in Abkhazia and Ngorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) conflicts. In Azerbaijan for example, the Russians became concerned by the election of the Leader of the anti-Russian pro-Turkish Azerbaijan Popular Front Elchibei. Seeing the possibility that Turkey and Iran could enter into its zone of interest Russia tried successfully to manipulate the domestic political environment in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. This direct involvement in Azerbaijan resulted in the 1993 coup that removed then President Elchibei and brought Aliev to power.
With Aliev in power Russia brought Armenia and Azerbaijan to the mediation table and Azerbaijan joined the new Russian led economic union the Commonwealth of Independent States or the CIS. It is speculated that, as a result of this interference, Russia also managed to renew an agreement to station it troops in the territory and receive a share of Azerbaijan’s offshore oil profits[9].
Further proof that Russia likes to keep everyone out of its backyard came from the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia. Abkhazia has traditionally held close ties to Moscow to offset the power of its Georgian rulers. But in 1993 Russia utilised the conflict between the two states to move forward its defensive line. Supplying Abkhazia with military personnel and weaponry Russia undertook a series of destabilizing actions (including not stopping the military incursions by the Abkhazians on the 17 of September 1993) which forced the Georgians to accept a peace deal that brought them into the CIS and gave Russia special base rights and other military privileges[10].
Interestingly it appears that the Russians have utilised this tactic time and time again to secure sections of their outer rim which they fear are being coerced by foreign powers. Using a variety of military and domestic agitation Russia in each of these scenarios and various others, like Transdniestr in Moldova, have managed to create a conflict through which they could then ‘enforce and secure a peace’ and leave them firmly in Russia’s zone of influence.
Putting the Ukraine in their Place
In terms of the Ukraine it could be argued that Russia has entered into different territory. Far more aggressive tactics have certainly been applied, for the annexation of an entire region is not their usual modus operandi. But then again in each of the above conflicts there has never been a large Russian speaking minority. Nor was there a historical belief that the territory was and is ultimately a part of the Russian Federation as was the case with Sevastopol the Crimean capital[11].
Thus, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula is simply another step in the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ mission. Certainly this does fit in with both Russian 21st century foreign policy but it also provides a resolution to the Russo-Ukrainian decade’s long dispute over the former soviet military assets.
Unlike various other states that agreed to participate in the joint CIS military the Russians wanted to create, the Ukrainians had always had the resources, economic power, and strategic location to challenge Russia’s sphere of influence. Certainly the Ukrainian governments claim to the majority of the Black Sea naval fleet has always been a barb in the craw of the Russian Navy which has always highlighted the protection of the country’s southwest flank[12].
Thus deposing the corrupt pro-Russian president Yanukovich, while a necessity, was certainly waving a red flag to the Russian bull. Strategically, economically and politically Russia has simply acted in accordance with its nationalistic foreign policy and protected what it considered to be its own by historical right. Thereby putting the Ukraine, but particularly the European Union, on notice that it will not tolerate further European encroachment into its territory.
Western Impotence Vs Russian Impudence = Civil War
So as the Ukraine heads deeper into the territory of civil war, it appears for all to see how impotent the western powers are to help the Ukrainians. Certainly it would appear that while the western nations supported the protestors on the Maidan, the whole conflict could have been avoided had Brussels and Washington not been so intent upon forcing the Ukraine to choose between the East and the West. Knowing as they did how Russian foreign policy plays out it seems negligent that both the European Union and America were not prepared for this latest development. Regardless of the events leading up to this can the west help the Ukraine in what appears to be a conflict that the Russians are fully prepared to manipulate as they did in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.
Unfortunately the Western powers have a poor track record aiding countries within Russia’s sphere of influence. The lack of aid given to Georgia, Armenian and Azerbaijan and Moldova is illustrated clearly by their capitulation to Russian demands in the end. It has also illustrated clearly to Putin that he may do as he sees fit in his sphere of influence.
Thus, unless NATO is prepared to provide military and economic aid to the Ukraine to counter the Russians domestic manipulations, and demonstrate that they are willing to engage Russia on behalf of the Ukrainians, the Ukraine may enter into a protracted period of civil strife and even war against agitators that are not domestic but are channelled from across the border. This period of instability is sure to create much difficulty for the eastern territory’s and drive them further into the arms of mother Russia forcing the Ukrainian government to cede the eastern half of the state.
In doing so the Ukraine secures peace for its western half but Russia will gain more control over Europe’s gas and oil rents and enable Putin to create his dream of a New Eurasian Empire.
Putin’s New Economic Empire
Putin’s new goal for his next term in office is for the creation of a new Eurasian Economic Empire. Wanting to rival the European Union and Asia, Putin has outlined a plan to establish a Russian led Eurasian Union by 2015. This year was set as the deadline Nicklas Gvosdev argues because until 2015 the United States and NATO are tied up strategically in Afghanistan. But after this period they will again be free to focus on the European situation. He stated that
‘With the eastward expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions sputtering to a close, and with China still primarily focused on South and East Asia, Moscow feels it has the window to begin consolidating a new Eurasia. Rather than have the territory of the former Soviet Union effectively "partitioned" into European and Asian "spheres of influence," Russia instead can re-emerge as a leading global power by creating a new bloc of states that will balance the European Union in the West and a Chinese-led Asia in the East.’[13]
Putin’s goal appears to be to establish a mighty Russian run Eurasian economic empire which creates another economic bloc to rival Asia and the West. To do so he needs to convince his surrounding neighbours he has the bravado to defend this new economic union as he is currently demonstrating with the Ukraine.
Certainly it would appear that Putin’s government is becoming increasingly active in the protection of their petroleum interests in Europe. According to the former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen the environmental movements in countries like Britain have been infiltrated by Russian sources. Mr Rasmussen declared at a briefing for the Chatham House Foreign Affairs think tank that,
“I have met allies who can report that Russia, as part of their sophisticated information and disinformation operations, engaged actively with so-called non-governmental organisations - environmental organisations working against shale gas - to maintain European dependence on imported Russian gas.[14]
While derision has been heaped upon this suggestion from British environmental groups, it does demonstrate the wariness that many in NATO feel towards the Russian government. Such wariness is also a major obstacle to the completion of Putin’s grand. For as the European Union views Russia with increasing derision its desire to infiltrate the territories around Russia will increase exponentially. Creating the potential for a new geopolitical race that may engulf the Eurasian continent.
The Possibility of a Bridge too Far
The most likely scenario though is that the extension of Europe into Russia’s will create a situation that breaks the proverbial Russian foreign policy camel’s back. For if Russia follows its usual tactics of arming, or even supplying ‘rebels’, the Ukraine will push back and given its military capability it may even succeed in driving these militant forces into making a mistake that will destroy the movements support within the Ukraine . But the cost to Russia’s standing may be huge.
Previously Russia has only played these black op destabilisation games with smaller less significant nations. If mistakes occurred it was not played out in an open international context. But within the Ukraine this is no so. Western Ukrainians are highly motivated to draw the Ukraine and other Russian satellite states into the E.U’s. sphere, and this is reciprocated by the European Union which wants to capitalise on gas and oil accessibility of many of these states.
If Russia is proven to have had a hand in any major international incidents within the Ukraine this could incite many European nations to seek direct intervention in the Ukrainian conflict. Peacekeeping missions or even the arming of western Ukraine could become a reality. When faced with the combined fire power of Europe, NATO and the United Nations Putin would be forced to shelve his plans of a creating a Russian led political and economic empire.
[1] Jonson,L & Archer C, 1996, ‘Russia and Peacekeeping in Eurasia’, in, Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, eds. L.Jonson and C. Archer, p.3-32 Westview Press.
[2] Machiavelli, 2012 , p.43
[3] Crimea was made part of the Ukrainian territories in 1954s by Nikita Khruschev a former head of the territory.
[4] Peyrouse, "Nationhood and the Minority Question in Central Asia," 495-96
[5] Krutaine, A & Mardiste, D, 2014, ‘Disquiet in Baltic’s over Sympathies of Russian Speakers’, Reuters.
[6] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/ukraine-nationalist-attacks-russia-supporters-kremlin-deaths
[7] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/ukraine-nationalist-attacks-russia-supporters-kremlin-deaths
[8][8] Jonson and Archer, 1996, 10-11.
[9] Jonson and Archer, 1996, 14-15
[10] Jonson and Archer 1996, 16-17.
[11] This belief was enshrined in 1993 by a resolution of the ex-Supreme Soviet that Sevastopol was and is a fundamental part of the territories of the Russian Federation. (Tuminez, A, 1996, Nationalism and the Interest in Russian Foreign Policy, in The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War,eds. C.A Wallander, Westview Press, pp.41-68.
[12] Russell, W, 1995, Russian Relations with the Near Abroad, in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, ed. P. Shearman, Westview Press, pp. 53-70.
[13] Gvosdev, 16/4/2012, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-new-ussr-6783
[14] A. Rasmussen , 19/6/2014 , ‘Nato boss claims Russia has secretly infiltrated green groups fighting fracking’, in the The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nato-boss-claims-russia-has-secretly-infiltrated-green-groups-fighting-fracking-9549975.html
Friday, 6 March 2015
The Growing Influence of China in Central Asia
The United States Russia
Yet the all out star of the rush for Central Asia has been China
PTROKAZAKHSTAN had been sold toChina ’s national oil
company China China to pay such a high
price reflects China 's
desire both to secure energy and to cement ties within Central
Asia .[1]
PTROKAZAKHSTAN had been sold to
Certainly Kazakhstan
and China Kazakhstan has become China
second biggest trading partner in the CIS following Russia
One
illustration of the increasing relations in the year 2006 is the opening of the
Kazakh –China oil pipeline which although not fully operational until 2007-2008
will deliver an estimated 20 million tonnes of oil per annum to China’s Xinjiang refineries. Kazakhstan ’s foreign minister, Kasymzhomart
Tokaev, has recently announced that Kazakhstan
also plans to deepen its commitment to fuelling China
by developing a gas pipeline with Turkmenistan
However,
Kazakhstan is not the only
Central Asian nation linking itself to China China China Uzbekistan , ostracised from the western world due human rights abuses, China
Shanghaied
Theorists like Niklas Swanstrom argue that
“The Sinofication of the Central Asian economy has gone so far that
the Central Asian states have become dependent on Chinese investments and
Beijing has in turn been able to dictate the Central Asian states policies
toward ‘terrorists’ ie Uyghur rebels from Chinese Xinjiang.” [5]
This influence has not been an overnight phenomenon. Starting early
in the first rough years of Central Asian independence China initiated a regional co-operation framework which
has become known as the SCO or the Shanghai Co-operation Organization.
Colloquially called the Shanghai Six it has enabled China United States Uzbekistan highlighted that this reprimand was
no idle threat and has forced the US
to rethink its strategy toward Central Asia
and the Shanghai Six. The United States has also been seeking,
unsuccessfully, to gain observer status in the SCO who at present have allowed
four other countries observer status including Mongolia ,
Iran , India and Pakistan
Nevertheless Central Asian leaders are not without a hand in the
matter. Many of them view China
as a balancing force to Russia
and the United States China
However many Central Asian elites are concerned with the growing Sino-Central
Asian relationship. Many are apprehensive of the growing numbers of Chinese
merchants and businessmen in each of the states. Some are concerned that like
Indonesia or the Solomon Islands and many other South East Asian countries the strong
Chinese diaspora will create competition for the native merchants to gain access to the establish
paths to economic resources and political power..
They argue that in states where patronization is a key part of
everyday life and economic resources are utilized as part of such dealings. Thus the sinozation of the economy would also
allow ethnic Chinese unprecedented access to political elites, thereby
hindering the local patron-client relationships and giving the Chinese
influence over national political affairs.
Yet , it appears that Central Asian leaders are aware of the danger
of allowing China Kazakhstan
“China Kazakhstan India
As
such it appears that Central Asian leaders have realized that reliance upon one
dominant superpower is not a favorable situation for development. Instead a
system of multiple alliances with international players provides more scope for
their own growth.
Security
the Real Issue?
Suspicion is growing though, that China China ’s Color Coded Crackdown argues that Central Asia is now a target for Chinese
authorities due to the recent democratic revolutions have swept across the
Caucasus and Central Asia [8].
In the article it is claimed that in the
Hong Kong based Open magazine ’a report by Chinese President Hu
Jintao, titled "Fighting the People's War Without Gunsmoke", is
guiding the Chinese Communist Party's "counterrevolution" offensive.
The report, disseminated inside the party, outlines a series of measures aimed
at nipping a potential Chinese "color revolution" in the bud.”[9]
According to Yuanbing author of the article China ’s Colour Coded Crackdown from Foreign
Policy. com President Hu has asked that ‘experts be dispatched to Central Asia to study how those colour revolutions first
sprung roots.’[10]
Thus it appears that China
[1]Macdonald, J, 2005, ‘China
[2] China.org, 2006, “Bilateral Trade Relations’, China.org Online Newswire,
http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=165943&p_qry=kazakhstan
last accessed on 20/05/06
[3] Hu Qihua,
2005, ‘Sino-Kazakh Strategic Partnership set up’ , China
[4] Mevlut Katik , 2006, ‘Kazakhstan has "Huge Plan" To Expand
Energy Links with China
[5] Swantstom, N, 2001, ‘China
conquers Central Asia through Trade’, The
Analyst Online Journal, http://www.cornellcaspian.com/pub/0104swanstrom_china.htm last accessed 20/05/06
[6] Radio Free Asia, 2004, China’s Growing Influence in Central Asia,
Part 1 A Major Player in Need of energy’, in Radio Free Asia Online
Journal, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/in_depth/2004/11/19/central_asia/,
last accessed 21/05/06.
[7] Mevlut Katik , 2006, ‘Kazakhstan has "Huge Plan" To Expand Energy Links with China
[8] Engdahl, F. W, 2005,
China Lays Down the gauntlet on the Energy War’ , Asia
times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GL21Ad01.html
, last accessed on the 21/05/06
[9] Yongding,
2005, ‘China
Friday, 8 February 2013
Clans
What I find most fascinating about studying developing countries is the identity politics that have a strong basis in their social constructs. For example in many Central Asian societies the clan has formed a backbone through which society regulates itself. As social identity construct the clan effects many areas of the society. In Kazakhstan for example it maybe how you get a job, car, house or even a wife. It often how business deals are arranged and it has far reaching side effects on the political and economic systems. So what is a Central Asian clan ? To answer that question here is an abbreviated explanation from my dissertation.
By Dr. Victoria Kelly-Clark
Grant, I.F, 1930, The Social
and Economic Development of Scotland
before 1603, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh
Gulliver, P.H, 1971, Neighbours
and Networks the Idiom of Kinship in Social Action among the Ndendeuli of Tanzania , University
of California Press, Berkley.
Krader, L, 1963, The People of
Central Asia, Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Parkin, R, 1997, Kinship: An
introduction to Basic Concepts, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford.
Journals
Antoun, R, 2000, ‘Civil Society and Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View , International Journal Middle
East Studies, Vol.42, 441-463.
Clan - the merging of Kith and Kin
By Dr. Victoria Kelly-Clark
the
horde that had ceased to be independent by becoming an element in the more
extensive group and that of segmented societies with a clan base to peoples who
are constituted through an association of clans. We say of these societies,
that they are segmented in order to indicate their formation by repetition of
like aggregates in them..... and we say of this elementary aggregate that it is
a clan, because this word.... expresses its mixed nature at once familial and
political, (Durkheim, 1964, 175)
The term clan has been classified in a
variety of manners throughout the development of the social sciences and anthropological
studies. To the scholars of the 19th and 20th centuries
the term clan[1] conjured up images of
tartan, blue paint, kilts and war. Primarily this conceptual image is because
the study of clans was first pursued in relation to the families of the
Scottish highlands and their hostilities. Inherent in this European notion was
the concept that a clan was a unique family group that had formulated a
hierarchical structure bound to a specified territory. Those in the group
claimed unilineal descent from a historical or mythical maternal or paternal
ancestor (Parkin, 1997, 17-18; Adam, 1970, 98). As argued by Grant a clan was
essentially thought of as a ‘hybrid institution, a mixture of tribal tradition
clustering about the ipso facto land
holder of the soil’ (Grant, 1930, 101-103).
Yet this description of clans is deficient
when applied to the case of Central Asia .
Essentially this is because it does not take into consideration the unique
features and environment of Central Asian clans. These clans, while accepting
that patriarchal and lineal descent are an integral part of belonging to a
clan, were also noted for their adoption of those outside the line of descent
and their inclusion of clients who were beneficial to the clan. They were also noted
for their reformation of a clan based on regional instead of familial
groupings. As a result the above
definition or explanation is a fairly etic[2] approach to such
social groupings.
The problem with the initial definition is
because the inclusion of kith in the original understanding of clan structure
was overlooked. Adam argues this was because clients were often presumed by
anthropologists and ethnologists to be part of the clan via the assumption that
all members living on or within the clans' territorial boundaries must be kin (Adam,
1970, 152). Therefore the concept of clan did not take into account the fact
that clans or the social groups we label clans can also include large numbers
of individuals who are not consanguineously related.
In Central Asia the structure of the
society is unique in that there were settled and nomadic societies and although
both still functioned around the principle of family they each developed in
specific ways. Ask a Tajik, Kazakh, Uzbek or Kyrgyz about his or her clan structures[3]
and one will find that they can be either regional or familial based, or even
both. They are more than just an extended family; instead they are an
ascriptive solidarity unit that functions like an imperium in imperio or an empire within an empire with the family
unit being the core. Within the clan, ever expanding circles are linked through
patron and client relationships binding members together in an intricate web.
(Krader, 1963, 149-155; 157-160)
These smaller groupings often include
clients (friends, cousins, trusted associates) within the network. In the
Mongol state for example the Keshig
Chinggisid’s personal guards were regarded by the leader as close members of
his clan. Yet in reality these men were drawn from all the clans within the
horde. This allows individuals who may not be related, through trust and
personal patronage, to become part of a clan regardless of blood ties. Similarly in Central Asian states today many
networks have clients who are tied into a clan by key communal foundations of
continuity, security, locality and welfare of the group (Gulliver, 1971, 4).
An example of this can be seen in the
friendship rituals of young male Kazakhs who will even call their group of non
related and sometimes ethnically diverse masculine friends by the phrase “their
boys” and as brothers.[4]
These bonds often form an integral part of the Kazakh youths access
networks. As they see no issue in
utilising their friends personal networks to gain further access to fulfil
their diverse wants and needs as they go throughout their life. This illustrates that while membership in
Central Asian clans is often familial based this is not an individual’s sole
network. Instead familial ties form a
core which is then surrounded by an individual’s, work, university, school and
childhood alliances, as well as local or mestnichestvo
ties, and ties from the mahalla
or neighbourhoods.
Furthermore, elites within the clan often
establish a beneficial patrimonial set of alliances outside of the traditional
patriarchal structure. This in turn brings clients into the clan as they are
adopted from outside the supposed blood line. This adoption will of course
provide some fictitious link to the clan and will also expand the set of
networks available to the clan (Krader, 1963, p.157-166)[5]. Thus members of
a clan in Central Asia come from a variety of
social, political and economic strata. The ties invariably run horizontally and
vertically through the society linking both elites and non-elites (Collins,
2006, 16).
An important characteristic in each of
these formations though is the member’s recognition of jus familiare and patria
potestas both of which are argued to have kept these societies as a
cohesive social, economic and legal entity (Adam, 1970, 117-140) for generations.
In this model the Central Asian clan corresponds to Weber’s idea of patriarchal
authrority in that a clan’s community does not just see its leader as a
figurehead that represents their interests. Instead they believe and expect a
measure of control over how the clan is ruled, the distribution of goods and
resources and the how the clan’s interests are governed through their patrons
and clients within the network.
These rights are regarded as significant
by members of the network and as such proving one’s legitimacy as a clan member
is important. Thus verbal knowledge of one’s genealogical ancestry dating back
several generations or regional grouping was and to some extent still is an
important factor in gaining membership of a group. It is also significant in an
individual’s placement within the overall social structure. As argued by
Krader,
In Central Asia a clan may be very large, compromising
thousands of members spread over a wide area. Clansmen can often not have met
others of their clan and on meeting they establish their relationship as clan
members, their relative seniority and precedence, authority over each other and
their claim of hospitality and support. Each clan member legitimates his
membership through his genealogy and establishes his position, both in regard
to other individuals and to the group (Krader, 1963, 156).
Thus the social structure of the clan
meant that the society had a pre-existing set of norms and values through which
they could regulate themselves and those in the world around them. The
successfulness of this arrangement provided such a strong civic framework that
the clan’s political structure ran congruent with the existing social
structure. One only needs to look at three of Central Asia ’s
major historical state structures to understand that social and political
worlds have always been intertwined. The Kök
Khanate, Turkic Khanate and the Chinggisid
State
The Kök were the architects of a
bicephalous state system which relied heavily on the nomadic clans to organize
and create a functioning state. The Kök used the clan social infrastructure to
choose a new leader, to maintain control over their vast territories and the
large clan confederations. To the Kök, clan or tribal law was tantamount to
state law and the management of the society’s affairs indisputably was the role
of the tribal leaders.
Likewise the Turkic Oghuz principality
functioned in a similar fashion. The state was theoretically headed up by a
clan-endorsed candidate but in reality power was shared with other elders from
within the clan. The reason behind this being that other clans within the
confederation did not feel isolated from the state and unable to interact with
the state infrastructure, which again was, based loosely on the society’s
informal institutions.
Furthermore the Chinggisid period of
states that occurred some two centuries after the demise of the Oghuz
Principality also based its state around the tradition of the clan. Under the
leadership of Chinggis Khan many tribes or clans who did not support his
leadership were split up and reformed into new units as part of the military
infrastructure of the tumen (nominally
the 10, 000 warriors). Likewise each of the sons of Chinggis was granted a
patrimony which they ruled over with their own blood brothers, supporters and
kinsmen. Thus again recreating a clan-confederations which were loyal to
Chinggis and to his successor Oghutay.[6]
Consequently clans in Central
Asia have played a significant part in governing the society by
establishing systems of civic governance. Despite this lack of separation
between the web-like structure of state and society that is Central Asian
clan’s hierarchical system, clan members still recognised that a social
contract exists between members. In other words a patron-client relationship
will function between the elites and the rest. The elites are then expected to
protect and look after the welfare of the ordinary members within their clan
via their access to the state and territory’s resources. Clients are in turn
are expected to support and keep the elites in their position of power and
influence (Antoun, 2000, 441- 446).
This patriarchal version of the social
contract means that as people are helped to achieve positions of authority by
the clan, the clan is able to utilize this connection to benefit their members.
In modern times this has meant that the informal institutions must pervade the
state’s formal institutions. The bureaucracy, state financial institutions,
security services, media outlets or the state owned resources are all areas in
which clans in Central Asia have located
themselves and from such positions are able to influence and manipulate the
state. Thus, as argued by Kathleen Collins, ‘a clan is an informal
organization’ which, similar to any state-run institution, operates to allow
the population access to political, economic and social resources (2004, 231).
[1] The term clan itself comes from the
Scottish Gaelic word clanna which
means children and as such referred to the children of a single patriarch.
European anthropologists distinguished it as an offspring of the constructed
tribes or in Gaelic tuath by the fact
that it predominantly refers to members of a singular descent rather than a
society that shares customs and beliefs. (Adam, 1970, 143)
[2] The term etic comes from Thomas Headland, Kenneth Pike and Marvin Harris's
work Emic and Etic: the Insider/Outsider Debate. Headland, Pike and Harris argue
that an etic perspective is defined
the intrinsic concepts and categories that have meaning for a scientific
observer. In other words in an etic
perspective scientists or social scientists are the sole judges of the validity
of an etic account. While in an emic perspective focuses on the cultural
distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a given society. As a result
only the native members of a society or culture can provide a valid description
or definition (Headland, Pike and Harris, 1990)
[3] It important to note here that
Central Asia is not a region with a single community living within its
boundaries, various manifestations of civilisations have existed within the
boundaries of present day Central Asia . Along
the oases and more fertile areas such as the Fergana
valley, Samarkand or Bukhara the idea of a clan has taken a
different conceptualisation due to the sart
(settled inhabitants) or merchant social and economic environment of the area
(Bacon, 1966, 3).
[4] Often these associates are met during
the first years at work, university or college (Robbins, 2007, 66-72) .
[5]
Fieldwork Notes by Author
[6] For a more comprehensive look at how
clans were a integral part of each of these civilisations please contact author for full document
Bibliography
Books
Adam, F, 1970, Clans, Septs and
Regiments of the Scottish Highlands , Johnston
and Bacon, Edinburgh .
Bacon , E.E, 1966, Central
Asians Under Russian rule, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca , New York
Barthold, W, 1968, Turkestan Down
to the Mongol Invasion, Lowe and Brydone Ltd, London
Collins, K , 2006, Clan
Politics and Regime Transition in Centrla Asia, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge .
Durkhiem, E, 1947, The Division of Labour in Society,
trans. George Simpson, The Free Press, New York
Headland, T, Pike, K, & Harris, CC, 1990, Emics and Etics: the insider/outsider debate, Sage Publications, Newbury Park
Robbins, C, 2007, In Search of Kazakhstan
the Land that Disappeared, Profile Books Ltd, London
Collins, K, 2004, ‘The Logic of Clan Politics Evidence from the
Central Asian Trajectories’, World
Politics, Vol. 56, January, 224-261.
Friday, 4 January 2013
Syria the Heart of a New Great Game
Although I have focused much of my time over the past few years on Central Asia, Syria has always been a country to fascinate me mainly because of how the Alawite minority managed to maintain its power. Recently, Syria has emerged again for all the wrong reasons. Here is my take on the latest crisis.
The Middle Eastern
Version of the Great Game
By Dr. Victoria Kelly-Clark
Last week it was estimated by opposition groups that 60 000
people have now died as a result of the ongoing violence in Syria. After nearly two years of the civil uprisings it is clear that unlike Libya, Tunisia and
Egypt, this will not be an easy victory for either side. Rather, it is shaping into a region-wide
protracted battle which threatens to engulf the entire region in a ‘game of
shadows’.
The Great Game is afoot
In recent weeks the countries around Syria have began to
involve themselves more in the ongoing struggle between the ruling government
and the opposition forces. Turkey, most
significantly, bombed Syrian targets for five days, and Israel made targeted
strikes on Syrian mobile artillery after mortars were fired into the Golan
Heights. While Israel is concerned with
the integrity of their border, it appears the other countries within the region
are playing a very different game.
Saudi Arabia, for example, is reported to have been
supporting the rebel forces by boosting the ranks with jihadists or religious warriors who see the Shia Assad clan’s rule
as heretical. Other sources claim that
the United States and Turkey are supporting the opposition forces by feeding
weapons into Syria via Turkey. Reuters reported back in February 2012 that
British and Qatari troops were also coordinating the delivery of these weapons
into locations such as Homs.
If these rumours are true then it appears that this is not
just a simple regime transition. Quite possibly this is an international
manoeuvre to try and stem Iran’s growing dominance over the northern areas of
the Middle East.
The Rise of Shia
At present, Shiite backed minorities are in power in Iraq,
Iran, and to a lesser extent in Lebanon thanks to Hezbollah. The growing Shia
power and influence throughout the Middle East is alarming to many of the Sunni
governments in the region. Saudi Arabia, for example, is afraid of the Iranian
government stirring up its Shia population which resides in the oil rich east
of the country. Bahrain is also under threat from a Shia uprising, as is Yemen,
all of which threatens to cause instability in these countries. Meanwhile Turkey and Iran are jockeying for a
regional leadership position.
Assad’s Strength
Despite the international and domestic pressure on Bashar
al-Assad, he has remained firmly at the apex of the Syrian state. However, like
any pyramid, the point is only strong thanks to the wealth of supporting blocks
that lie underneath. Al-Assad’s unwavering support comes from both his clan
control over the top position of state power and the fact that his minority
group, the Alawites and their tribal patronage networks, strategically control
the military, security and intelligence forces within Syria. Al-Assad also
dominates the political process through the monopoly of the Ba’ath Party.
Originally known as
the Nosayris, the Alawites are a small minority group based in the mountain
region of Latakia near the Mediterranean Sea.
The Alawites belong to an obscure branch of Shia Islam that rejects
common practices like Shariah, the call to prayer, attending the mosque for
worship, and the ban on alcohol. They also are believed to celebrate Christian
holidays and this placed them in a vulnerable position in a predominantly Sunni
state.
Estimated to be 11% of the Syrian Population the Alawites
were not treated well by Syria’s mainly Sunni Muslim population thanks to their
status as heretics. This has caused the
Alawites to become increasingly dependent on clan ties and more exclusive of
other sectarian groups within the state.
The Alawites received some relief during the French
occupation of the region. The French believed that the Alawites were a
necessary component to controlling Syria thanks to the Alawite’s homeland’s
crucial access to the Mediterranean Sea. They encouraged the Alawites to join
the military, utilising them as a buffer against the Sunni majority. The
Alawites then consolidated their position in the armed forces through the
creation of the Ba’ath Party.
We All Come Tumbling
Down
It is these three pillars that are allowing al-Assad to
remain in power despite this rigorous opposition and it is their strength that
could cause another protracted conflict in the Middle East. Certainly the
Alawite minority is right behind Bashar al-Assad, with the BBC reporting that
at the regular Alawite funerals held, pictures of Bashar adorn houses and
funeral goers chant “ Martyr after Martyr we only want Bashar.”
If this conflict does continue it begs the question “how far
are the Shia alliance of powers and the Sunni Crescent (Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Qatar, Yemen etc) willing to go to in this Great Game to control the region?”. If it is an all-in game then we could be
looking at a region-wide conflict that involves all Shia forces around the
Middle East and could last for generations.
This is a result that could have world-wide ramifications from oil
shortages to financial meltdowns.
Written with Sources from Reuters, Stratfor and BBC.
Welcome
Welcome
Hi and welcome to Central Asia and Beyond. I have set up this blog as an outlet for my constant mental analysis on my regions of specialty, Central Asia and the Middle East. Here you will find posts on a topic or issue that has bothered me throughout the week and my analysis on these topics. You will also find links to the first chapters of my Doctoral Dissertation and Masters Dissertation. I hope these will help you understand more about these fascinating areas if you feel so inclined to read them.
Hi and welcome to Central Asia and Beyond. I have set up this blog as an outlet for my constant mental analysis on my regions of specialty, Central Asia and the Middle East. Here you will find posts on a topic or issue that has bothered me throughout the week and my analysis on these topics. You will also find links to the first chapters of my Doctoral Dissertation and Masters Dissertation. I hope these will help you understand more about these fascinating areas if you feel so inclined to read them.
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